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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating
actions on the 10-year government bond spreads for Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain
with respect to Germany. Using a unique tick-by-tick dataset over 1/02/2009-05/31/2012, we
identify the impact of the three drivers via jump and cojump detection procedures. Disentangling
the pre- from the post-announcement effects, real economy and forward looking news releases from
US and Euro area, country specific Spanish and German macroannouncements, and auctions hold
in distressed countries such Italy and Spain have a statistically and economically significant effect.
No role is played by rating actions.
Keywords: Jumps, Cojumps,Government Bond Spreads, Macroannouncements, Government
Bond Auctions, Rating Actions.
J.E.L. Classification Numbers: C58, C12, H63, G24.
Europe is under stress and integration among European countries seems more fragile than ever.
Starting from the subprime crisis in 2007, markets are more aware of the differences between
European countries, and this sentiment is reflected, amongst others, in increasing differentials of
government bond yields. In 2008 and 2009, government bond spreads became sizable but it was in5
2010 and 2011 that spreads substantially increase, reaching levels even higher than those experienced
in the pre-Euro era. It was just after the famous Mario Draghi’s ”whatever it takes” in July 2012 that
a more normal situation on government bond markets was restored. The European sovereign debt
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crisis involving, although at different extents, all the peripheral countries have questioned the much
celebrated markets’ self-regulatory power as well as the ability of policy makers and regulators to10
adopt stability measures and stimulate economic growth. Thus, understanding which factors drive
sovereign risk is particularly timely also for the macroeconomic consequences of the comovements
associated to these factors. For instance, higher spreads deteriorate borrowing capabilities and
market confidence which simultaneously impact on consumption and investment. The way to
ameliorate the effects of the crisis on the real economy is a current political debate but the recipes15
to be put in place still need to be fully understood.
In this paper, we identify the role that market movers like macroeconomic announcements, gov-
ernment bond auctions and rating actions have in driving government bond markets, and whether
the occurrence of specific events in a country affects other European countries. To this aim, we
make use of a unique dataset of high frequency data on 10-year European government bond spreads.20
Moreover, we analyze the impact of the three drivers on both conditional mean and variance spec-
ifications, disentangling the pre- from the post-announcement effect. The econometric analysis is
conducted using recent developments in the financial econometrics literature on jump and cojump
detection procedures.
In the literature, the relationship between macroannouncements and returns is widely studied25
while the sensitivity of jumps is analyzed in a handful of papers such as [1], [2] and [3]. In particular,
[2] estimate jumps and cojumps at intradaily frequency mapping them to macro news to find that
bond markets are the most sensitive to news releases and that macroannouncement surprises are
associated with cojumps even more consistently than jumps. [2] point out the advantage of using
very high frequency data to study the impact of such events. On the other hand, [3] conclude30
that although a majority of jumps occurs at prescheduled news announcement times, surprises
related to macroannouncements have limited power in explaining bond price jumps. Moreover,
authors show that liquidity shocks play a key role in explaining jumps and that usually, during the
preannouncement period, it is possible to observe a drop in market depth. [3] explain this result as
that, as also discussed in [4], dealers tend to withdraw orders and place them further out to avoid35
being picked off in the upcoming information event. Thus, authors conclude that jumps observed in
correspondence to macroannouncement releases are not only determined by news, but also by the
drop in liquidity that is a market mover per se.
As far as government bond auctions are concerned, we refer to [5] where the impact of US
treasury auctions on returns is assessed. [5] compute the ”surprise” effect as the difference between40
the yield in the when-issued market with the actual ex-post yield without relevant findings.
Finally, although rating actions are expected to be an important determinant of spreads, as
creditworthiness represents the long-term sustainability of countries’ debt, the role and reliability
of credit rating agencies (CRA) has been under investigation. In addition to concerns on CRAs
effective capability to give accurate risk assessments, there is a sustained debate about the timing45
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of recent downgrades of European sovereigns claimed to promote uncertainty in financial markets:
see for instance [6], [7], [8], [9] and [10]. In terms of the impact of rating actions, [11] reports
that ratings are systematically related to daily movements in sovereign bond spreads, to budgetary
developments, and that rating actions are not anticipated at 1-2 months horizon; in addition,
authors show the existence of spillover effects, especially from lower rated countries to higher rated50
countries, as well as of persistent effects for recently downgraded countries. In our analysis, we
consider also S&P, Moody’s and Fitch separately to measure the distinct impact of the three rating
agencies motivated by the results reported in [12] where it is shown that S&P is more active and
provides higher flow of news information than Moody’s and Fitch during crisis periods.
This paper makes an important contribution to the literature on the empirical determinants of55
government bonds spreads. Using a unique tick-by-tick 10-year government bonds spreads resam-
pled at 5-minute frequency, we map jumps and cojumps to the three main drivers of spreads. We
show that jumps and cojumps are very sensitive to macroannouncements from US and Euro area
but also to individual countries releases in particular to those related to Germany and Spain. As
per the category of macroannouncements, a very relevant role is played by real economy indicators,60
in particular US non-farm payroll, and forward looking indicators, such as consumer confidence
and purchase manager index. In addition, significant is the role of the ECB Introductory State-
ment, bringing to the market the key information concerning decisions on ECB rates. We show
the importance of taking into account the pre-announcement effect turning out to explain a great
amount of jumps. Pre- and post-announcements convey different kind of information, with pre-65
announcements providing an indication about traders’ perception of future news relevance while
post-announcements, captured by surprises, leading traders to revise their positions according to
the actual releases. As far as government bond auctions are concerned, they explain a great deal
of jumps and cojumps, especially for auctions hold in Italy and Spain. On the contrary, rating
actions play no role as determinants of spreads’ movements. Finally, we observe an increasing70
number of jumps and cojumps during the preannouncement periods for both macroannouncements
and auctions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we describe the data. In
Section 2, we introduce the testing procedures adopted to detect jumps and cojumps and the
summary statistics of identified jumps and cojumps events and related market activities (Section75
2.1), we map jumps to macroannouncements, auctions and rating actions and we introduce the mean
and variance models we propose (Section 2.2). The empirical results are reported and discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
3
1. Data Description
1.1. Spreads80
We use data for the benchmark 10-year government bonds of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and Spain over the period 2nd January 2009 - 31st May 2012. We consider bid,
rather than mid, data as more representative of the spreads during crisis periods considering the
widening of bid-ask spreads witnessed by bond markets. The 10-year bond benchmarks are identified
according to maturity and liquidity criteria. Morningstar provided us with this unique tick-by-tick85
data sample that we resampled at 5-minute frequency using previous tick scheme and calendar
time, excluding time intervals with missing values for at least one country. The 5-minute frequency
is robust to microstructure noise and offers sufficiently high frequency information to properly
evaluate the impact of specific events. Moreover, this frequency is consistent with previous seminal
contributions such as [5] and [13].90
The trading period considered is 8 a.m. - 3:30 p.m. coordinated universal time (UTC). We
remove holidays and detect and remove outliers by applying a filter which is a modification of
the procedure proposed in [14], implemented following the steps suggested by [15] ( p. 156). We
summarize the procedure below.
Let pt,i be a tick-by-tick time series of log-prices, where t denotes day and i the time interval of
day t, then an observation is removed if:
∣∣pt,i − pt,i (kL)∣∣ > max {4MDt,i(k), nγ} ∧ ∣∣pt,i − pt,i (kR)∣∣ > max {4MDt,i(k), nγ} (1)
where k is the bandwidth, pt,i
(
kL
)
and pt,i
(
kR
)
are sample medians of the k/2 observations95
respectively before (L for left) and after (R for right) (t, i), MDt,i(k) is the mean absolute deviation
from the median of the whole neighborhood of length k, ∧ is the intersection operator, γ is the
granularity parameter and it is computed as the mean of the kabsolute returns and n is γ−multiplier.
k and n are set equal to 20 and 10 respectively, in order to ensure that the neighborhood of ticks
does not get too wide and that the threshold to identify outliers is reasonable.100
The advantage of this rule lies in the separate comparison of the (t, i)−th trade against the left
and right neighbors while the measure of dispersion is calculated on the whole bunch of k trades.
This approach is specifically designed to avoid detecting jumps as false outliers.
Finally, we also remove the first return of the day that occurs at 8 a.m. as it largely reflects the
adjustment to information accumulated overnight and hence exhibits a spurious excess variability105
compared to any other five-minute intervals. Data selecting procedure is summarized in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 somewhere here]
In Panel A, for each time series, we report the overall number of ticks available from which
we remove holidays, weekends and trades occurred outside the trading period 8 a.m. - 3:30 p.m.
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UTC. We also remove outliers following the description in (1) which lead us to detect percentage of110
outliers ranging from 0.11% for Germany to the 0.19% for Belgium. In addition, we also report some
descriptive statistics to get useful insights about market liquidity. In particular, we compute the
mean number of trades per day and the time elapsed between two consecutive trades; both statistics
indicate that the most liquid market is the German one with a daily average number of trades of
2,629 and a trade duration of 10.2 seconds, followed by Spain (910 trades, 28.5 seconds), France115
(908 trades, 29.4 seconds), Italy (805 trades, 33.1 seconds), Belgium (780 trades, 34.1 seconds)
and the Netherlands (586 trades, 45.4 seconds). After resampling at the 5-minute frequency and
removing the 8 a.m. time interval for each day, we end up with 78,660 returns, covering 874
days corresponding to 90 observations per day. In Table 1, we also report descriptive statistics
about yields and spreads with respect to German Bund: Italy and Spain have the highest average120
yields, both corresponding to 4.67%, while Germany has the lowest equal to 2.76% denoting its
safe heaven status; the average bid spread on Germany is equal to 192 bps for Spain, 191 for Italy,
106 for Belgium, 54 for France and 35 for the Netherlands. Of course, the information that the
average indicator offers is limited in the light that government bond spreads vary a lot throughout
our sample period as can be seen from Figure 1.125
[Insert Figure 1 somewhere here]
Government bond spreads were moving very closely until May 2010, when markets start to pay
more attention to sovereign debt risk in correspondence to the burst of Greek crisis. In May 2010,
Greek government deficit was revised and estimated to be 13.6% of GDP with a correspondent
decrease in international confidence in Greece’s ability to repay its sovereign debt. As consequence,130
despite the first rescue package approved by Eurozone countries and the IMF, concerns about Euro
countries solvability began to raise together with spreads.
In Panel B of Table 1, we report the analysis of the trading activity around the public events we
are taking into consideration namely macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating
actions. The time window analyzed ranges from 1 hour before up to 1 hour after the release of135
each event. We compare both the number of trades per hour as well the time elapsed between two
consecutive trades with respect to trading hours with no particular events. There is no evidence of
a different trading activity around the events analyzed.
1.2. Macroannouncements
As far as macroannouncements, we consider news releases related to the US, the Euro area,140
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In some cases, we
are unable to use all the available macroannouncements as they are released when some markets
are still closed. This is for instance the case of France, with releases occurring between 6:30 and
7:45 a.m. UTC. Finally, in case of Spain, although macroannouncements are released at 8:00 a.m.
5
UTC, we keep these indicators shifting them to 8:05 a.m. in order to match with spreads data.145
Data related to macroannouncements are median expected value by survey panelists (E), forecasts
standard deviation (σ) and actual value of the release (A) and they were collected from Bloomberg.
A complete list of analyzed macroannouncements is presented in Table 2 where we report even
details on surprises, defined as S = (A− E)/σ.
[Insert Table 2 somewhere here]150
The size of the surprises related to US and Euro area macroannouncements are smaller than
those concerning individual countries, implying a more accurate forecast by surveyors in the first two
cases, though it is fair to mention that the number of surveyors interviewed for US and Euro area
releases is higher than for individual countries. Finally, we drop the France industrial production
given that in only two cases macroannouncements were released after 8 a.m. UTC, and the Portugal155
preliminary GDP because of its very high dispersion (standard deviation equals 10.7) due to both
poor forecasts and low number of surveyors for this specific news.
1.3. Bond Auctions
We take into consideration auctions of European countries issuing Euro-denominated bonds:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.160
Most auctions take place between 8 and 10 a.m. UTC. To capture the performance of an auction,
we use two main variables: the average yield at which the government sells the bonds and the
bid-to-cover, that is how many bids the Government received with respect to the total offer. These
two data were collected just for auctions relative to 10-year bonds as they not only correspond to
the maturity of the spreads analyzed but they even represent the most relevant ones.165
In Table 3, we report the total number of auctions per country together with the detail of 10-year
bond auctions for which we provide mean and standard deviation of average yield and bid-to-cover.
[Insert Table 3 somewhere here]
Bid-to-covers are very similar for all the countries analyzed ranging from a minimum of 1.42
for Italian auctions to a maximum of 2.34 for French ones, while average yields reflect countries170
different sovereign risk: safer countries such as Finland and Germany succeed in selling bonds at
higher prices and lower returns, with an average yield of 2.75% and 3.04% respectively, while riskier
countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal allocate their bonds at an average yield of 4.76%, 4.85%
and 5.01%, respectively.
1.4. Rating Actions175
We collect data concerning rating actions from the three main rating agencies: Standard &
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. The aim is not only to assess whether downgradings have an impact on
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government bond spreads but also to investigate whether some agencies have bigger and/or more
lagged impacts. Note that in our sample, we deal mainly with downgrading actions as only two
upgrading actions occurred during the period considered, namely on 22nd February 2011 and 13th180
March 2012 for Greece. Downgrading actions were taken against Austria, Belgium, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain as reported in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 somewhere here]
2. Econometric Identification and Modelling of Jumps and Cojumps
2.1. Identifying Jumps and Cojumps185
We briefly describe the testing procedures implemented to identify jumps and cojumps.
2.1.1. Detecting Jumps
As we are interested in identifying the exact time of occurrence of jumps, the [16] (ABD hence-
forth) and the [17], (LM henceforth) jump detecting procedures are the only two suitable tests to
this purpose1. In the light that the ABD and LM tests assume that spot volatility is approximately
constant over the local window, we use the [16] filtered J test (FJ) statistic based on the standard-
ization of returns by a periodicity component ŝt,i which has the function of making the volatility
time-varying through the local window:
FJt,i =
|rt,i|
σ̂tŝt,i
(2)
where |rt,i| is the absolute value of return on day t and time-interval i defined as pt,i−pt,i−1 and σ̂t is
the bipower volatility of day t. [19] show that the filtered jump test statistics increases the accuracy
of intraday jump detection methods. To obtain an estimate of the periodicity component ŝt,i,190
we implement the [19] robust estimation technique based on the Truncated Maximum Likelihood
(TML) estimator. The parametric specification we adopt for ŝt,i is similar to the one proposed by
[20] but here we include even government bond auctions and rating actions as follows:
ŝt,i =
exp f
(
θˆTML;xt,i
)
√
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
exp f
(
θˆTML;xt,i
))2 (3)
1[18] report a comprehensive comparison between the alternative testing procedures to detect jumps.
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f
(
θˆTML;xt,i
)
= δ0 + δ0,1
i
N1
+ δ0,2
i2
N2
+Jj=1 λjS
j
t,i +
B
b=1φbR
b
t,i +
4
j=1 ϑjWeekdaysj +
P
p=1
(
δc,p cos
(
2pip
N
i
)
+ δs,p sin
(
2pip
N
i
))
+ εt,i (4)
where N represents the number of intraday intervals i belonging to day t; N1 = (N+1)/2 and N2 =195
(N + 1)(N + 2)/6 are normalizing constants; Sjt,i is the surprise for macroannouncements and
government bond auctions (for the last ones, surprises are computed as the difference in bid-
to-cover between current and previous 10-year auction); J is the sum of macroannouncements
and auctions considered; Rbt,i represents a dummy variable for rating action undertaken by rating
agency b; B is the number of rating agencies; λj and φb are event specific loading coefficients; P is200
a tuning parameter determining the order of the expansion of the sinusoids; θˆTML is full parameter
vector to be estimated; xt,i denotes the entire set of explanatory variables. Moreover, the loading
coefficients λj and φb are modeled applying the AndersenBollerslev1998 decay-structure which
allows the specific event to impact over a time window with decaying weights. Macroannouncement
surprises are allowed to impact starting from 30 minutes before the release up to one hour and205
30 minutes after, as in [20]. As far as government bond auctions are concerned, we use a wider
window, ranging from two hours before the auction ends up to one hour after it as we want to take
into account markets uncertainty during the auction period. Finally, as the timing of rating actions
is unforeseeable, we set the start of the window in correspondence to the rating action up to two
hours after it.210
2.1.2. Detecting Cojumps
In order to evaluate markets interdependence, we assess whether they share a simultaneous
jump, that is whether there is evidence of a cojump. To identify cojumps, we adopt the definition
proposed in [2]. Given C assets, the contemporaneous cojump is defined as:
CoJumpt,i =
C∏
c=1
I
(∣∣FJct,i∣∣) (5)
where I(.) is the indicator function taking value 1 in case on day t at the interval i there was a
significant jump FJt,i. In order to identify a sufficient number of cojumps for further analysis, we
define a cojump if two or more jumps occur within a 15 minutes time window.
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2.2. Modelling Jumps and Cojumps215
2.2.1. Mapping Jumps
We now turn to assess the linkage between jumps and their possible determinants, namely
macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions. To this purpose, we compare
the number of jumps around a pre-specified event with respect to other periods as it is discussed later
in the paper. However, this simple comparison does not take into account either other variables220
which could cause the observed difference going beyond the impact of the single event or the
concurrence with other news. Moreover, it is widely documented (see for instance [13]; [21]; [22]
that it is not the release per se which explains jumps, as the surprise related to a particular event;
in the case of government bond auctions, we define the surprise as the difference in the bid-to-
cover and the average yield with the previous auction of bond of the same maturity. When the225
release is within market expectation, there is no reason for market to jump after the announcement.
Moreover, when two releases occur simultaneously, the only way to impute the impact to the correct
release is to use surprise.
The econometric model we propose is able to map jumps to macroannouncements, government
bond auctions and rating actions in both the process governing the conditional mean and the
conditional variance of government bond spreads. With respect to the conditional mean, we extend
the Tobit-GARCH model in [2]:
|FJt,i| =
{
µ+ ηt,i + µt,i + ξt,i + εt,i
0
if > 0
otherwise
(6)
where |FJt,i| is the absolute size of significant detected jumps; ηt,i is the linear combination of day-
of-the-week dummies; µt,i is the standardized US news surprises
J∑
j=1
λj
∣∣∣Sjt,i∣∣∣; ξt,i is the intraday230
periodic component and N the number of intraday periods within a day. [2] allow for a potential
delayed response to news by testing for lagged news; moreover they correct for heteroskedasticity
estimating the Tobit-GARCH model of [23].
With respect to the conditional variance, rather than a simple GARCH model as in [2], we use
a GARCH formulation driven by macroannouncements quite similar to the one adopted in [24]:
ht,i = ω1 + ω2Dt,i−1 + βht,i−1 +
(
α1 + α2D
∗
t,i−1
)
ε2t,i−1 +
(
ν1 + ν2D
∗
t,i−1
) (
ε−t,i−1
)2
(7)
where macroannouncements impact in three alternative ways. First, ω2 allows for the unconditional
volatility level to differ from ω1 when an announcement Dt,i−1 is scheduled in the near future.235
This is the so-called pre-announcement effect and, if it is found to be positive, it implies a higher
unconditional volatility level in the period preceding the releases. Second, the coefficient α2 captures
the difference in persistency of macroannouncements with respect to news with small surprise and
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to other kind of news. In particular, D
∗
t,i−1 are dummy variables taking value 1 in case the absolute
size of the surprise is greater than its standard deviation and zero otherwise. If the parameters α2240
are found to be negative/positive and statistically significant, this means that macroannouncements
bringing a big surprise are less/more persistent with respect to regular shocks. Finally, ν2 accounts
for a different leverage effect in correspondence to macroannouncements and, if it is found to be
positive/negative, it implies that negative surprises have higher/lower impact than positive ones
and that the leverage effect is more/less pronounced for macroannouncements with respect to news245
with small surprise and to other kind of news.
2.2.2. Modelling Jumps
The jump model we estimate is a Tobit-GARCH where both the mean and variance processes
are driven by macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions. In particular, we
allow for a pre-announcement effect that takes into account future releases of macroannouncements250
and government bond auctions for a pre-specified number of time intervals, while rating actions are
excluded as they are not pre-scheduled. As per post-announcement, we consider surprise effects
related to macroannouncements and auctions rather than simple dummy variables, the only excep-
tion being the rating actions which indeed enter the model by dummy variables taking value 1 after
the rating action got public. Finally, another novelty in our model is that we allow the surprise255
effect to impact for a pre-specified time window after the release; the surprise is in fact weighted
by a polynomial decay structure as the one adopted in [20] for modelling intraday periodicity. [25]
and [2] both account for delayed response of markets after an announcement but they enter their
model with lags of the surprise, each loaded by its own coefficient, making the estimation procedure
quite cumbersome. In our model instead we just need to estimate coefficients for decaying-weighted260
surprises, covering the 12 time periods (one hour) following the release. The model for the mean
equation takes the following form:
|FJt,i| = µ+
J∑
j=1
γ1,jD
j
τI [τ ∈ ((t, i) , (t, i+ ∆))] +
J∑
j=1
γ2,j
∣∣Sjτ ∣∣ I [τ ∈ ((t, i−∆) , (t, i))] +
B∑
b=1
γ2,J+bR
b
τI [τ ∈ ((t, i−∆) , (t, i))] + εt,i (8)
where |FJt,i| is the absolute size of significant detected jumps with α = 0.05 by the LM test filtered
by the intraday periodicity estimated by (3) and (4); Djτ are dummy variables taking value 1 if
macroannouncements or government bond auctions are prescheduled in the next ∆ periods after265
(t, i);
∣∣Sjτ ∣∣ are absolute surprises for macroannouncements and government bond auctions released
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up to ∆ periods before (t, i); J is the overall number of macroannouncements and auctions; Rbτ
are dummy variables taking value 1 if a rating action was undertaken up to ∆ periods before (t, i);
εt,i|zt,i−1 ∼ N (0, ht,i), zt,i−1 is the information set available up to (t, i− 1).
The conditional volatility ht,i is specified as follows:270
ht,i = ω1 +
J∑
j=1
ω2,jD
j
τI [τ ∈ ((t, i) , (t, i+ ∆))] + βht,i−1 +α1 + J∑
j=1
α2,jD
∗ j
τ I [τ ∈ ((t, i−∆− 1) , (t, i− 1))] +
B∑
b=1
α2,J+bR
b
τI [τ ∈ ((t, i−∆− 1) , (t, i))]
)
ε2t.i−1 +ν1 + J∑
j=1
ν2,jD
∗ j
τ I [τ ∈ ((t, i−∆− 1) , (t, i− 1))]
+
B∑
b=1
ν2,J+bR
b
τI [τ ∈ ((t, i−∆) , (t, i))]
)(
ε−t.i−1
)2
(9)
where Djτ denotes the dummy variable taking value 1 if a macroannouncement or an auction is
scheduled to take place in the next ∆ periods after (t, i); D∗ jτ denotes the dummy variable taking
value 1 for large macroannouncement surprises or big changes in bid-to-cover or average-yield
occurred in the previous ∆ periods; Rbτ denotes the dummy variable taking value 1 if in the previous
∆ periods a rating action occurred.275
Unlike [24], we define large surprises if the absolute surprise is higher than one half of the
standard deviation of this measure for all the macroannouncements of the same kind in order to
set a unique rule for macroannouncements and bond auctions as, for auctions, we do not dispose of
standard deviation of forecasts.
2.2.3. Modelling Cojumps280
We adopt a simple logit model where the dependent variable is a dummy variable: cojump
occurrence vs. non occurrence 2. The cojump model has the same specification adopted for jump
mean in (8) although here surprises are loaded by unitary weights throughout the response window
rather than by a specific weighting pattern. The cojumps are determined on the basis of jumps
identified by the LM test filtered by the intraday periodicity as discussed in Section 2.1. Considering
that although we are modeling the simple event, cojump vs no-cojump, the identified cojumps are
2A multinomial model allowing to distinguish between 2, 3, 4 or 5 cojumps occurrence probability could not be
implemented because only very few observations are available for each class of cojumps.
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very few and that logit model require at least 20% of events to get robust estimates (see for
instance [26], we proceed by oversampling and creating an artificial sample of size M with all the
identified cojumps representing 20% of M while the other observations are chosen randomly. The
procedure provides consistent and efficient estimates provided appropriate statistical corrections are
implemented. To this purpose, we adopt a prior correction approach consisting in computing the
usual logistic regression estimators corrected using prior information about the fraction of ones in
the population, τ , and the observed fraction of ones in the sample, y. For the logit model, [26] show
that the MLE β̂i estimator for the covariate in the subsample is a statistically consistent estimate
of βi while the corrected estimate for the intercept β0 is:
β̂0 − ln
[(
1− τ
τ
)(
y
1− y
)]
(10)
3. Empirical Findings
3.1. Preliminary Analysis
As first step in assessing the relationship between jumps and macroannouncements, bond auc-
tions and rating actions, we compare jumps occurrence around a specific event with respect to other
periods. We set the time window for the macroannouncement releases and government bond auc-285
tions ranging from 1 hour before up to 1 hour after the release while for rating actions, given that
these events are not pre-scheduled as the other two are, the response window covers the two hours
following the release. For the selection of the time windows, we refer to [27], [28] and [29] who find
that the stock price response essentially completes in the trading day and, more precisely, within
one hour after the announcements3. Moreover, in order to properly set response time windows,290
we analyze the real behaviour of the absolute returns around the event specified. In Figures 2-3,
we report the mean absolute returns around macroannouncements, government bond auctions and
rating actions together with the 95% confidence level, on the left, and the same statistics but for
days with no event although around the typical hour of release on the right. We distinguish between
US and Euro macroannouncements as the usual release time is between 13:30 and 15:00 UTC and295
between 8:00 and 10:00 UTC respectively. On the x-axis we report the number of 5-minute intervals
preceding/following the time of release. In Table 5, we report statistics on detected jumps for each
country and a comparison of jump occurrences during news with respect to no-news periods4.
3[30] shows that announcement surprises induce large but short-lived increases in volatility within thirty minutes
of the announcements. [13], [31] and [32] confirm that reaction times to news are very short
4Though, as already mentioned in the paper, we may identify jumps by applying the ABD and LM testing
procedures, we only report the LM tests adjusted for the intraday periodicity estimated by TML as this is the
procedure allowing to reduce spurious jumps detection (see for instance [19]). Further, estimates for the intraday
periodicity in (4) are not reported here but are available upon request.
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[Insert Figures 2-3 and Table 5 somewhere here]
Overall, macroannouncements play an important role in explaining jumps in all countries. In300
particular, the biggest impact is due to US and Euro area releases while news concerning individual
countries seem to play a minor role, with the most relevant ones being those on Germany, the
engine of Europe. As far as the economic category of macroannouncements is concerned, news on
US and Euro area real economy, such as production and employment indicators with the non-farm
payroll (the so called ”king of macroannouncements”), are the most important together with Euro305
area and individual country forward looking indicators, such as confidence indicators and purchase
manager index. Instead, news on inflation and money demand have a minor role. Focusing now
on government bond auctions, although they do not seem to be a fundamental market mover
in aggregate, when focusing on auctions hold in countries with very high public debt, such as
Italy, Greece and Belgium, we see that government bond spreads of almost all countries jump310
substantially5. In particular we detect a higher proportion of jumps around Italian and Greek
auctions for all the spreads considered and around Spanish auctions for all spreads but Belgian.
Finally, it is interesting to note that auctions hold in Belgium cause a higher number of jumps only
in Belgian spread.
Turning to rating actions, there is some evidence that they too cause jumps in particular when315
these actions are undertaken by S&P and Moody’s. In addition to that, a crucial role is played by
the country which was the object of the rating action. In particular, actions taken against countries
such as Belgium, Italy and Spain cause jumps on government bond spreads while actions against
smaller and more fragile countries such as Ireland and Portugal do not seem to have any significant
effect. This result contradicts those reported in other studies. Alsakka and Gwilym (2012) find that320
Moody’s decision to downgrade Greece to Caa1 from B1 on 1st June 2011 determined an increase
by 12 basis point in Greek 10-year government bond yields and a decline of bond prices for Ireland,
Spain and Portugal. On 13 June 2011, S&P downgraded Greece from B to CCC (with negative
outlook), causing Greek, Portuguese and Irish 10-year bond yields to jump of 16.79%, 10.66% and
11.34% respectively. See also Alsakka and Gwilym (2013).325
With the purpose of detecting a large number of cojumps, we define cojump if two or more jumps
occur in a 15-minute time window rather than in a 5-minute window. When we define a cojump
considering a 5-minute time window we come up with just 1,956 cojumps while, when expanding
the time window to 15 minutes, we can detect up to 3,478 cojumps. However, whenever possible,
we conduct our analysis on both 5-minute and 15-minute window with substantially unchanged330
5The debt-to-GDP ratio defined as consolidated general government gross debt to GDP in 2011 and 2012 respec-
tively was 72.5% and 73.4% for Austria, 97.8% and 99.6% for Belgium, 49.0% and 53.0% for Finland, 85.8% and
90.2% for France, 80.4% and 81.9% for German, 120.8% and 127.0% for Italy, 65.5% and 71.2% for the Netherlands,
108.3% and 123.6% for Portugal, 69.3% and 84.2% for Spain (Eurostat).
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results (Results are available upon request).
In Table 6, we report the analysis for cojumps identified using (5).
[Insert Table 6 somewhere here]
Results confirm what already reported for the analysis on jumps. In particular, US and Euro
area macroannouncements are the most important drivers of cojumps, with particular relevance335
of those concerning real economy and those related to forward looking measures. With respect
to individual countries, the only releases determining jumps are those from Germany and those
conveying some information about the economic sentiment. As per auctions, those impacting the
most are again those held in Italy, Greece and Spain although some evidence is found even with
respect to Belgian and German auctions. Finally, as per rating actions we overall confirm the340
limited impact that such kind of news have on government bond markets. Some evidences of a
higher proportion of cojumps is found just with respect to actions undertaken against Italy, Greece
and Spain, three of the GIIPS countries.
3.2. Results for the Jump Model
The first step to estimate the model for the absolute jump size in (8) is the estimation of345
the response pattern of jumps on macroannouncements and government bond auctions. Once
jumps response patterns are estimated, we pre-select, for the mean equation, statistically significant
variables at α = 0.30 using a simple Tobit regression. After this pre-selection, we estimate jointly
the mean and the variance equations (8) and (9), respectively, following [23].
3.2.1. Mean Equation350
Table 7 reports the results of mean equation in (8). Tobit coefficients measure the impact of
a change in the corresponding independent variable on the latent dependent variable weighted by
the probability of being above the threshold. In our case, this corresponds to the probability of
observing a jump. Due to space constraint, we only report variables significant for at least one of
the countries under analysis.355
[Insert Table 7 somewhere here]
Results reported in Table 7 highlight the relevant role that macroannouncements and government
bond auctions have in explaining jumps in government bond spreads. In particular both effects,
pre- and post-announcement, turned out to be statistically significant. In addition to that, it is
interesting to note that relevant news are not coming just from the US an the Euro area, but360
even some releases concerning individual countries, especially from Spain and Germany, are often
important in explaining government bond spreads. This result constitutes an additional evidence in
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favor of the strong linkages existing among European countries. Finally, no role is found for rating
actions.
Entering now in details of results reported in Table 7, we can infer that the pure knowledge about365
a forthcoming announcement in the following hour is statistically important in explaining jumps.
In this respect, 4 out of 16 US, 8 out of 13 Euro area and 6 out of 26 individual countries future
macroannouncement releases significantly determine jumps. US non-farm payroll together with the
Introductory Statement are the most important jumps driver in the five series considered with a
coefficient ranging from a 0.0061 for France to a 0.0588 for Belgium in the case of US non-farm pay-370
roll and from 0.0118 for Italy to 0.0769 for France with respect to the ECB Introductory Statement.
Besides these two announcements, the other main drivers of jumps during the pre-announcement
period are US Chicago PMI for Italy, France and Belgium, Euro area industrial production on all
countries but France and Euro area purchase manager index flash on all countries but the Nether-
lands. As per individual countries news, future releases on Italian industrial production increase375
the probability of observing jumps for Italian, French and Spanish spreads, on Spanish industrial
production for French, Spanish and Belgian spreads and on Belgian business confidence for Italian,
Spanish and Belgian spreads. Thus, we found that the scheduled releases contribute in explaining
jumps, especially with respect to real economy and forward looking indicators, and that not only US
and Euro area related news are relevant, but even releases from Belgium, Italy, Germany and Spain380
matter. Note that the Belgian is the first confidence indicator released in Europe, each month, and
therefore it contributes in shaping the confidence about the economic environment.
Turning now to the post-announcement effects, 10 out of 16 from US, 5 out of 13 from Euro
area and 7 out of 26 from individual countries surprises are statistically significant. In particular,
the most important releases are US non-farm payroll, US GDP advance and the Introductory385
Statement, explaining large absolute jump sizes for all the five spread series considered. Among
other macroannouncements, we notice the statistical significance of US retail sales on Italy, Spain,
Belgium and the Netherlands, US consumer confidence indicator for France, Belgium and the
Netherlands, Euro area business confidence indicator for Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands and
Euro area PMI final on Italy, Spain and Belgium. As per individual countries, we signal German390
unemployment on France, Spain and Belgium and Spanish industrial production on Italy, Spain
and Belgium.
The most important finding of our analysis so far is the high sensitivity of government bond
spreads to US and Euro area macroannouncements together with to some individual countries news,
from Spain and German in particular. The worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic fundamentals395
represents an important news for the markets and particularly important is the role of unemploy-
ment (at present the highest in Europe) and the industrial production, that is falling more than in
any other European country. Moreover, while Greece and Portugal are small economies, Spain is
the fourth largest economy in the Euro area and this makes the deterioration of its macro funda-
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mentals extremely relevant to the markets. As far as Germany is concerned, the largest economy400
in Europe, markets pay attention to signals coming from Germany’s economic indicators as they
serve as leading indicators for the entire Euro area.
As per the category of macroannouncements, there is a confirmation of what already reported
in the preliminary analysis that is the important role played by economic indicators such as em-
ployment level and industrial production, and forward looking variables, with Euro area purchase405
manager index and US and Euro area confidence indicators, as opposite to those related to the
consumer prices/inflation indicator.
While the literature documents the importance of the US releases, the role played by the non-
farm payroll and GDP ([2], [3], [25], and Miao et al. 2012), and timing of the news releases (see
for instance [5], [33] and [32]) in explaining returns from various asset classes, there are some novel410
and interesting results from our analysis that the existing literature does not document. First of
all, we find evidence of the important role played by the ECB Introductory Statement bringing to
the market the key information concerning decisions on ECB rates. Moreover, our results show
the sensitivity of European government bond spreads not only towards US and Euro area releases
but also to individual countries, with particular reference to those related to Germany and Spain.415
Finally, we showed the importance of taking into account the pre-announcement effect which were
found to explain a great amount of jumps. Pre- and post-announcement convey different kind of
information with the first providing an indication about traders’ perception of future news relevance
while the second one, captured by surprises, leading traders to revise their positions according to
the actual releases.420
Focusing on government bond auctions, we can see that in the time frame preceding the pub-
lication of auction results the probability of observing jumps increases. In particular this holds
true with respect to auctions hold in Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain, namely the country with
the strongest economy in Europe together with three of the European countries which suffered
the most during the sovereign crisis. In addition to that, it is interesting to note that we observe425
both a self-referencing effect, i.e. auctions hold in Italy and Spain impact on Italian and Spanish
government bond spreads, as well as an outer effect, i.e. auctions hold in Greece determine a higher
probability of observing jumps in French, Belgian and Dutch spreads and auctions hold in Italy
on Spanish spreads. German auctions determine as well a self-referencing effect given that the
dependent variable are spreads of 10-year benchmark bonds on German Bund.430
German auctions are very important market movers even in the period following the publication
of auctions results. Differences in bid-to-cover of 10-year German auctions significantly explain
jumps in all the countries analyzed. The bid-to-cover captures market demand of auctioned bonds
with respect to the total offer and therefore it provides an indication about the market sentiment
towards those bonds. In particular, if German bid-to-cover increases, that implies that investors435
are switching their preferences towards German Bunds, acting during the sovereign crisis as a
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safe-heaven and denoting therefore an increasing risk aversion. Not only German bid-to-cover is
statistically significant in explaining jumps in sovereign spreads, but even Belgian bid-to-cover, on
Belgian spreads, and Spanish bid-to-cover, on Spanish spreads, confirming the existence of a strong
self-referencing effect.440
In addition to changes in bid-to-cover, results indicate that even differences in average yield of
current 10-year government bond auction with respect to the previous one contribute in explaining
jumps in sovereign spreads. In particular, auctions on French government bonds determine sizable
jumps in Italian and Spanish spreads while those on German bonds cause jumps on Italian, French
and Spanish bonds. Finally, auctions hold in Italy impact on French, Belgian and Dutch spreads445
and those in Spain just on Spanish spreads. Coherently with results on pre-announcement and
bid-to-cover, we find that the auctions explaining jumps in government bond spreads are those hold
in the most troubled countries during the sovereign crisis, namely Italy, Spain, and in the safest
European country, i.e. Germany. In addition to that, we point out that auctions hold in these
countries not only determine jumps in these countries, but even in other countries confirming the450
existence of strong interlinkages among European countries.
Finally, there is no evidence that rating actions determine jumps in sovereign spreads. Our
results contrast with findings in the literature assessing the impact of rating actions on returns
or jumps. [34] discuss that the most of the incremental information value is transmitted through
negative credit warnings (i.e., “outlooks,” “reviews,” and “watches,”), rather than actual rating455
changes. The same conclusion is also reported in [35], [36] and [12]. Our analysis confirms instead
a reputation issue attached to rating agencies: market participants do not rely on rating agencies
assessment in default risks in government bonds. This result can be read in light of the role they
played in the subprime crisis, provided they did not provide investors with reliable assessment of
the risk of structured products on US mortgage loans.460
3.2.2. Variance Equation
Table 8 reports the results of variance equation (9). Again, due to space constraint, we only
report variables significant for at least one of the countries under analysis.
[Insert Table 8 somewhere here]
The coefficients ω2,j , j = 1, ..., J account for a different level of unconditional volatility in465
correspondence to the future macroannouncement or government bond auction releases with respect
to time intervals not preceding any news. Those coefficients take a positive sign and are statistically
significant, suggesting that in the hour preceding one of the events in our analysis, the level of
volatility raises above the level ω1. In particular, 10 macroannouncements out of 55 are statistically
different from zero. The most relevant news are those concerning US, with non-farm payroll playing470
its usual leading role and being significant for all the sovereign spreads but Belgian, together with
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another real economy news, GDP final, determining sizable jumps for Italy, France and Belgium.
Among Euro area related news, a great attention is devoted to the forthcoming reading of the
Introductory Statement, being statistically significant for all the government spreads, but Italian,
and of the PMI flash for French and Belgian spreads. Moreover we found that the level of volatility475
raises just before the release of German ZEW, being statistically significant for France, Belgium
and the Netherlands, and Italian industrial production and Spanish unemployment, just impacting
Italy and Spain respectively.
Turning now the attention to auctions, we found some evidence of a raise in volatility in corre-
spondence of prescheduled auctions, in particular those hold in Greece and Italy.480
All variables used so far capture the pre-announcement effect. Once information is released,
traders process information and adjust the price according. Parameters α2,j , j = 1, ..., J+B account
for persistency of the surprise effect, once news has been released, while parameters ν2,j allow for
the different leverage effect in correspondence to negative surprise lead by macroannouncements
with respect to news with no or little surprise and to other negative news.485
As far as the persistency parameters are concerned, starting from macroannouncements we find
that 14 of them are statistically significant indicating that actually, macroannouncements bringing
a great surprise have a different level of persistency with respect to other news. In particular, given
that almost all the significant coefficients take a positive sign, we can conclude that macroannounce-
ments have a higher persistency. Focusing on the country and category of macroannouncements,490
we see that as usual those related to US and Euro area play a major role, with higher relevance of
real economy and forward looking indicators. For instance, one of the most important driver is US
non-farm payroll, US GDP final, Euro area Introductory statement and Euro area PMI final. The
persistency of the ECB Introductory Statement can be explained in light of the great amount of
information that it conveys which can take some time to be completely incorporated by the market.495
Moreover, the reading of the Introductory Statement per se together with the time devoted to ques-
tions and answers may take some time to be carried out. In addition, individual countries releases
with high persistency are German unemployment, Italian GDP final, Spanish unemployment and
industrial production, and Belgian business confidence.
It is interesting to see that news determining sizeable jumps in government bond spreads are500
even those which persist the most. Even with respect to government bond auctions, those with a
higher persistency are hold in Italy, Spain and Belgium, confirming results highlighted previously
in the paper.
Finally, let us take a look at the asymmetric effect. In particular, as far as both macroannounce-
ments and auctions are concerned, coefficients are positive and statistically significant implying that505
the leverage effect associated to these events, with a big surprise, is more pronounced than same
kind of news but with smaller surprises or with respect to other kind of news. We like to interpret
this finding given the high attention that these news deserve from markets, implying that a huge
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number of traders and portfolio managers take their decisions on these kind of releases. The evi-
dence of the higher leverage effect associated to macroannouncements with respect to other kind of510
news is also coherent with findings in [24].
Focusing on countries and categories of announcements determining a higher leverage effect, we
confirm results reported earlier in the paper. In particular, releases impacting the most belong to
real economy and forward looking categories, and concern mostly the US and Euro area, although
a number of releases on individual countries are statistically significant as well. As per government515
bond auctions, the most relevant are still those hold in Italy and Spain.
3.3. Results for the Cojump Model
In this final section, we report the results from model estimation for cojumps.
First, in order to get robust estimates, we remove all the dummy variables which had less than
15 observations for all the possible combinations with the dependent variable in a 2x2 contingency520
table; on the remaining variables we then estimate the logit model and adjust the estimates ac-
cording to prior correction. In Table 9, we report only statistically significant variables explaining
cojumps:
[Insert Table 9 somewhere here]
Results in Table 9 suggest that both pre- and post- announcement effects are statistically sig-525
nificant in explaining cojump occurrences.
As per macroannouncements, news related to US real economy play a prominent role, with
non-farm payroll, GDP and retail sales. The relevance of US non-farm payroll and retail sales in
explaining cojumps is also stated in [2]. Focusing on Euro are releases, we find confirmation of
the importance of the Introductory Statement, entering the model with both pre- and post- effects,530
together with Euro area forward looking measures, such as business confidence and PMI final. More-
over, even some individual countries releases contribute in explaining cojumps, with two Spanish
announcements, on GDP and industrial production, entering with their post-announcement effect
and German ZEW, pre-announcements, and German business confidence, post-announcement. Fi-
nally, even Belgian business confidence and Italian GDP final determine a higher number of cojumps535
in the hour preceding their releases.
As far as auctions are concerned, Italian auctions are crucially entering the model with the
change in average yield with a positive coefficient as well as with the pre-release effect. Even for
this model, the impact of rating actions is statistically insignificant. The indications from the
cojump models support therefore the existence of some leading news which, when associated to a540
big surprise, are able to determine sizeable movements in all or at least in most of the government
bond spreads analyzed.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper, we jointly modeled the impact of macroannouncements, government bond auctions
and rating actions on the 10-year government bond spreads for the benchmarks of Belgium, France,545
Italy, the Netherlands and Spain with respect to the German Bund, over the period 2nd January
2009 - 31st May 2012. We measured the impact of three drivers on both mean and variance
specifications, disentangling the pre- from the post-announcement effect, via the identification and
mapping of jumps and cojumps. We considered a wide range of macroannouncements covering
US, Euro area and individual countries together with government bond auctions and rating actions550
about largest European countries.
Our results show the high sensitivity of jumps and cojumps to US and Euro area macroan-
nouncements plus specific Spanish and German macroannouncements. With respect to macroan-
nouncements categories, very important is the role played by the variables concerning real economy,
such as US non-farm payroll, retail sales and GDP, together with the forward looking indicators555
among all consumer confidence indicators and purchase manager indexes; monetary news are found
to be irrelevant. Moreover, the Introductory Statement turned out to be a significant determinant
of both jumps and cojumps, confirming the key role that European Central Bank is having in the
management of the sovereign crisis. Finally, macroannouncements are important drivers for both
the mean and variance of spreads entering significantly at both pre- and post-announcement levels.560
Government bond auctions hold in countries experiencing deep economic downturn, such as
Italy and Spain, significantly explain jumps and cojumps together with those hold in the European
leading country, Germany. Finally, rating actions do not produce sizable jumps in the markets.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper assessing in a comprehensive way the drivers
of jumps and cojumps associated to government bond spreads. Our framework allows to consider565
simultaneously a relevant number of variables which is crucial in order to properly measure the
impact of these events; this is important also because macroannouncements in the Euro area and
government bond auctions take place at almost the same time. Finally, the evaluation of the
impact of auctions on spreads is relevant also to practitioners for determining their trading and
asset allocation strategies.570
There are important policy implications from our analysis. We showed that movements in
government bond spreads are significantly determined by macroannouncements and government
bond auctions, and thus in the recent sovereign crisis intraday movements were driven by changes
in macroeconomic fundamentals and not, or at least not only, by speculative actions. In addition,
the fact that events taking place in some individual countries, such as Germany and Spain for575
macroannouncements and Germany, Italy and Spain for auctions, have a significant impact in
other countries, shows the great level of interdependence existing among European countries.
The findings in this paper suggest interesting additional developments. Our analysis is very
comprehensive about the possible determinants of jumps and cojumps, however we envisage that at
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least three other possible drivers may play an important role in an uncertain and volatile environ-580
ment as the one that has been characterizing markets in the most recent years. In this paper, we
analyzed the impact of downgrading actions once the decision of the rating agency becomes public:
it will be interesting to study whether warnings and outlook changes announced by rating agencies
could have some impact on government bond spreads. The second issue deals with the analysis
of market’s reactions to political events. For instance, the inconclusive results of Italian elections585
of the 25th February 2012 brought on the market a high level of uncertainty which determined a
substantial increase in Italian government bond spread of 51 bps in just one day and which affected
even Spanish spread with an increase of 30 bps. The last factor, that will deserve an entire research
project, are policy announcements from central banks, considered for instance the great impact
that Mario Draghi’s whatever it takes had on government bonds. Finally, following [37] who look590
at announcement effects in the real and nominal US Treasury market using real yields, nominal
yields, and the spread between the two, we may also look at yields on the German Bund, yields on
the other bonds, and the spreads between them. This is part of an ongoing research agenda.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: 10-year government bond spreads (bps)
The figure reports the 10-year government bond spreads with respect to Germany for Belgium, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Spain over the period 2nd January 2009 - 31st May 2012. Spreads are computed on bid yields at
5-minute sampling frequency.
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(a) US macroannouncements (b) Not US macroannouncements
(c) Euro area macroannouncement (d) Not Euro area macroannouncement
(e) Individual countries macroannouncements (f) Not Individual countries macroannouncements
Figure 2: Market activities around events: US, Euro area and individual countries macroannounce-
ments.
The left-hand column of the figure plots the mean absolute returns together with the 95% confidence interval around
the release of the US, Euro area and individual countries macroannouncements. The right-hand column of the figure
plots the mean absolute returns around the typical average release time of the news: 14:15 UTC for US macroan-
nouncements, 9:00 UTC for Euro area and individual countries macroannouncements. On the x-axis, we report the
number of 5-minute intervals preceding/following the time of the release.
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(a) Auctions (b) Not auctions
(c) Rating actions (d) Not rating actions
Figure 3: Market activities around events: government bond auctions and rating actions.
The left-hand column of the figure reports the plots of the mean absolute returns with the 95% confidence interval
around the government bond auctions and rating actions. The right-hand column of figure plots the mean absolute
returns around the typical average release time of the news: 9:00 UTC for government bond auctions and 8:00 UTC
for rating actions. On the x-axis, we report the number of 5-minute intervals preceding/following the time of the
release.
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Table 1: Government bond yields and spreads: data selection and summary statistics
DE IT FR ES BE NL
PANEL A
No. ticks 2,980,063 917,630 1,035,631 903,233 799,610 605,155
Limiting trading time 2,294,951 704,701 794,602 796,529 682,408 512,789
Outliers: No. (%) 2,528 (0.11) 1,247 (0.18) 1,468 (0.18) 1,372 (0.17) 1,313 (0.19) 772 (0.15)
No. trades per day: Mean (SD) 2,629 (1,197) 805 (316) 908 (358) 910 (356) 780 (326) 586 (290)
Trade duration: Mean (SD) [s] 10.17 (27.01) 33.09 (62.97) 29.38 (58.16) 28.49 (57.85) 34.15 (69.05) 45.42 (82.33)
5-minute intervals 79,534 79,534 79,534 79,534 79,534 79,534
Exclude 1st daily obs 78,660 78,660 78,660 78,660 78,660 78,660
Bid YTM
Mean (SD) [%] 2.76 (0.58) 4.67 (0.80) 3.29 (0.37) 4.67 (0.75) 3.82 (0.42) 3.11 (0.57)
Median (1st - 99th percentiles) [%] 3.00 (1.44 - 3.57) 4.49 (3.75 - 7.05) 3.39 (2.49 - 3.97) 4.39 (3.75 - 6.49) 3.82 (2.94 - 4.87) 3.29 (1.93 - 4.04)
Bid-Ask Spread of YTM
Mean (SD) [bps] 0.63 (0.05) 0.65 (0.05) 0.8 (0.07) 0.76 (0.05) 0.97 (0.04) 0.7 (0.03)
Median (1st - 99th percentiles) [bps] 0.6 (0.55 - 0.76) 0.64 (0.59 - 0.81) 0.82 (0.68 - 0.94) 0.76 (0.7 - 0.9) 0.97 (0.89 - 1.08) 0.7 (0.64 - 0.77)
Bid Spread
Mean (SD) [bps] - 191 (124) 54 (34) 192 (117) 106 (63) 35 (16)
Median (1st - 99th percentiles) [bps] - 148 (60 - 513) 38 (20 - 154) 184 (50 - 481) 90 (34 - 295) 30 (15 - 81)
PANEL B
Around macroannouncements
No. trades per hour: Mean (SD) 298 (211) 86 (54) 96 (61) 96 (62) 83 (54) 63 (44)
Trade duration: Mean (SD) [s] 9.56 (25.05) 33.1 (63.87) 29.65 (60.45) 28.61 (58.68) 34.34 (71.29) 44.91 (82.37)
Not around macroannouncements
No. trades per hour: Mean (SD) 314 (178) 100 (46) 114 (53) 110 (54) 98 (48) 73 (41)
Trade duration: Mean (SD) [s] 10.65 (23.4) 32.96 (59.28) 29.09 (51.98) 28.31 (51.78) 33.83 (63) 45.49 (77.65)
Around auctions
No. trades per hour: Mean (SD) 257 (199) 80 (53) 89 (60) 92 (62) 75 (52) 56 (43)
Trade duration: Mean (SD) [s] 10.26 (30.86) 33.81 (72.5) 30.03 (64.25) 28.86 (63.25) 35.74 (77.55) 47.45 (92.91)
Not around auctions
No. trades per hour: Mean (SD) 334 (190) 103 (47) 116 (54) 110 (56) 100 (49) 75 (42)
Trade duration: Mean (SD) [s] 10.12 (21.62) 32.69 (58.43) 28.99 (52.21) 28.2 (51.43) 33.37 (63.17) 44.4 (76.38)
Around rating actions
No. trades per hour: Mean (SD) 263 (205) 74 (52) 82 (58) 83 (59) 70 (51) 59 (44)
Trade duration: Mean (SD) [s] 8.87 (24.4) 31.65 (51.31) 28.66 (49.94) 27.36 (50.68) 33.3 (58.21) 39.47 (59.91)
Not around rating actions
No. trades per hour: Mean (SD) 355 (184) 109 (44) 123 (50) 119 (53) 105 (46) 79 (41)
Trade duration: Mean (SD) [s] 10.17 (22.22) 33.06 (60.62) 29.31 (53.97) 28.44 (53.36) 34.07 (65.63) 45.44 (79.33)
PANEL A of the table reports the data procedure selection on government bond yields and spreads together with some summary statistics. Limiting trading
time means removing all holidays, weekend days and considering trades occurred between 8:00 and 15:30 UTC. Outliers are detected as described in eq.(1) in the
text. Tick-by-tick data are resampled using calendar time (see details in the body of the paper). The 1st observation of each day is removed as it presents excess
volatility. In square brackets is the unit of measurement. PANEL B of the table reports the analysis of trading activity around the three categories of events
analyzed: macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions. The window around the event ranges from 1 hour before the release up to 1 hour
after.
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Table 2: Macroannouncements with prescheduled releases
Country Macroannouncement Frequency Release time No. Category Surprise
(UTC) Mean (SD)
US Business inventories M 15:00 41 RE -0.55 (2.08)
Chicago PMI M 14:45 39 FL 0.87 (2.54)
Consumer confidence M 15:00 39 FL -0.29 (3.40)
CPI M 13:30 41 P 0.01 (1.03)
Durable goods M 13:30 40 FL -0.59 (2.70)
Factory orders M 15:00 40 FL 0.16 (1.11)
GDP advance Q 12:30 / 13:30 14 RE -0.13 (1.00)
GDP preliminary Q 12:30 / 13:30 14 RE -0.53 (1.45)
GDP final Q 12:30 / 13:30 13 RE 0.00 (2.28)
Industrial production M 14:15 41 RE -0.29 (1.82)
Initial jobless claim W 13:30 175 RE 0.00 (0.00)
Nonfarm payroll M 13:30 39 RE -0.09 (2.23)
Philadelphia FED Index M 15:00 41 FL -0.10 (3.69)
PPI M 13:30 41 P 0.06 (1.75)
Retail sales M 13:30 41 RE 0.05 (1.81)
University of Michigan M 14:55 39 FL 1.12 (1.49)
EA Business climate M 09:00 42 FL 0.17 (2.05)
Consumer confidence M 10:00 42 FL 0.14 (2.00)
Flash HICP M 10:00 42 P 0.07 (1.40)
HICP M 10:00 41 P 0.00 (0.00)
Industrial production M 10:00 41 RE -0.29 (1.82)
Introductory Statement M 13:30 40 RE -
M3 M 09:00 41 P -0.44 (2.66)
Monthly Bulletin M 10:00 41 RE -
PMI flash M 09:00 41 FL 0.18 (2.51)
PMI final M 09:00 41 FL 0.79 (2.87)
PPI M 10:00 41 P -0.05 (0.86)
Retail sales M 10:00 41 RE -0.79 (1.66)
Unemployment M 10:00 41 RE 0.41 (1.67)
DE CPI preliminary M 13:00 37 P 0.00 (1.32)
IFO: business confidence M 09:00 41 FL 1.24 (2.55)
Industrial production M 11:00 41 RE -0.15 (2.58)
Unemployment M 08:55 42 RE -0.63 (2.54)
ZEW M 10:00 41 FL 0.73 (2.53)
IT Business confidence M 08:30 / 09:00 41 FL 0.26 (2.85)
CPI preliminary M 10:00 42 P 0.35 (2.49)
CPI final M 09:00 / 10:00 41 P -0.98 (3.00)
GDP preliminary Q 09:00 / 10:00 13 RE -1.33 (2.78)
GDP final Q 09:00 / 10:00 12 RE -0.25 (0.87)
Industrial production M 09:00 41 RE -0.04 (2.44)
FR Industrial production M 07:45 / 08:45 2 RE 6.67 (25.93)
ES CPI M 08:00 41 P 0.06 (0.75)
GDP preliminary Q 08:00 14 RE 0.14 (2.03)
GDP final Q 08:00 14 RE -0.29 (0.73)
Industrial production M 08:00 40 RE -0.38 (2.69)
Unemployment Q 08:00 14 RE 0.75 (1.42)
PT CPI M 10:00 40 P -0.84 (2.79)
GDP preliminary Q 10:00 14 RE 6.43 (10.70)
GDP final Q 11:00 12 RE -3.00 (2.38)
NL CPI M 08:30 39 P 0.02 (1.18)
Industrial production M 08:30 39 RE -0.65 (3.74)
Unemployment M 08:30 41 RE -0.37 (2.14)
BE Business confidence M 14:00 41 P 0.10 (2.19)
GR CPI M 10:00 40 P -0.84 (3.49)
GDP preliminary Q 08:30 / 10:00 8 RE -0.19 (1.03)
GDP final Q 08:30 / 10:00 7 RE -3.00 (2.38)
Unemployment M 10:00 38 RE -0.02 (2.61)
The table reports a description on macroeconomic announcements released in the period 2nd January 2009 - 31st May
2012. In some cases the release time changes according to the summertime. FL stands for Forward Looking, P for price
and RE for Real Economy macroannouncement categories. Surprise is computed as (Actual Release -Median Forecasts)/SD
Forecasts.
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Table 3: Government bond auctions
No. of auctions No. of 10-year Average yield [%] Bid-to-cover
bond auctions Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Austria 34 15 3.64 (0.68) 2.16 (0.44)
Belgium 113 25 3.98 (0.55) 2.07 (0.56)
Finland 8 4 2.75 (0.46) na
France 271 38 3.61 (0.59) 2.34 (0.75)
Germany 220 35 3.04 (0.84) 1.53 (0.29)
Greece 53 0 - -
Italy 193 46 4.76 (0.75) 1.42 (0.17)
the Netherlands 142 18 3.42 (0.74) na
Portugal 104 16 5.01 (0.79) 2.05 (0.76)
Spain 163 25 4.85 (0.81) 1.94 (0.40)
The table reports a description of government bond auctions hold in the period 2nd Janaury 2009 - 31st May 2012.
Average yield: yield at which the government allocated the bonds issued in an auction. Bid-to-cover: ratio between
the number of bids the Government received and the amount of bonds offered. Average yield and bid-to-cover are
collected just for auctions concerning 10-year bonds.
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Table 4: Rating actions
S&P Moody’s Fitch
Austria 13-Jan-12 - -
Belgium 25-Nov-11 16-Dec-11 27-Jan-12
France 13-Jan-12 - -
Greece 14-Jan-09 22-Dec-09 22-Oct-09
16-Dec-09 22-Apr-10 08-Dec-09
27-Apr-10 14-Jun-10 09-Apr-10
29-Mar-11 07-Mar-11 14-Jan-11
09-May-11 01-Jun-11 20-May-11
13-Jun-11 25-Jul-11 13-Jul-11
27-Jul-11 02-Mar-12 22-Feb-11 (•)
27-Feb-12 09-Mar-12
02-May-12 13-Mar-12 (•)
17-May-12
Ireland 30-Mar-09 02-Jul-09 08-Apr-09
08-Jun-09 19-Jul-10 04-Nov-09
24-Aug-10 17-Dec-10 06-Oct-10
23-Nov-10 15-Apr-11 09-Dec-10
02-Feb-11 12-Jul-11
01-Apr-11
Italy 19-Sep-11 05-Oct-11 07-Oct-11
13-Jan-12 13-Feb-12 27-Jan-12
Portugal 21-Jan-09 13-Jul-10 24-Mar-10
27-Apr-10 16-Mar-11 23-Dec-10
24-Mar-11 05-Apr-11 24-Mar-11
29-Mar-11 06-Jul-11 01-Apr-11
24-Nov-11 24-Nov-11
13-Jan-12
Spain 19-Jan-09 30-Sep-10 28-May-10
28-Apr-10 10-Mar-11 07-Jul-11
13-Oct-11 18-Oct-11 27-Jan-12
13-Jan-12 13-Feb-12 07-Jun-12
26-Apr-12
The table reports the rating actions undertaken by S&P, Moody’s and
Fitch during the period 2nd Janaury 2009 - 31st May 2012. All the rating
actions presented in Table IV are downgradings, the only exceptions are
the two upgradings (•) which took place on 22nd February 2011 and 13th
March 2012 for Greece by Fitch.
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Table 5: Jumps: summary statistics
All countries IT FR ES BE NL
PANEL A No. 10,169
2,720 1,460 2,767 2,107 1,115
P(Jump) 2.62 3.51 1.88 3.57 2.72 1.44
Mean abs Ssze (%) 2.31 2.74 2.08 2.54 2.23 1.97
z-test z-test z-test z-test z-test z-test
PANEL B: Macroannouncements
All 5.73 *** 3.95 *** 3.57 *** 3.64 *** 5.30 *** 4.62 ***
US 6.44 *** 4.29 *** 3.61 *** 4.29 *** 5.32 *** 5.65 ***
Euro area 3.78 ** 3.49 ** 0.90 2.37 *** 2.80 *** 1.93 **
Individual countries 1.40 * 0.99 1.72 ** 0.92 1.34 * 0.88
Germnay 2.03 ** 1.41 * 3.05 *** -0.17 2.47 *** 1.32 *
US - Real economy 6.55 *** 3.73 *** 3.62 *** 4.21 *** 5.97 *** 6.37 ***
US - Forward looking 1.53 * 1.66 ** 0.48 0.89 0.79 1.08
US - Price 2.26 ** 0.51 2.22 ** 1.80 ** 1.43 * -0.27
Euro area - Real economy 3.16 *** 2.44 *** -0.01 1.15 3.13 *** 1.84**
Euro area - Forward looking 2.28 ** 2.86 *** 0.91 2.27 ** 0.86 1.33 *
Euro area - Price 0.25 0.66 -0.64 -0.17 0.12 -1.58
Individual countries - Real economy 0.65 0.24 0.86 -0.46 0.29 -0.03
Individual countries - Forward looking 4.47 *** 2.39 *** 2.12 ** 3.20 *** 3.04 *** 2.58 ***
Individual countries - Price -2.54 -1.24 -0.44 -1.24 -0.5 -0.27
PANEL C: Bond auctions
All 1.28 * 0.1 0.85 1.41 * 0.22 0.72
France -1.92 -1.72 0.02 -0.71 -2.17 -0.39
Germany -1.51 -1.46 -0.15 0.36 -0.91 -0.41
Belgium 3.31 *** 1.40 * 1.50 * -0.24 2.77 *** 1.13
Greece 4.30 *** 1.59 * 3.08 *** 1.46 * 4.78 *** 3.72***
Italy 3.72 *** 3.23 *** 1.67 ** 3.05 *** 1.83 ** 1.59 *
Spain 3.82 *** 2.03 ** 1.35 * 1.98 ** 1.03 3.31 ***
PANEL D: Rating actions
All 4.08 *** 1.34 * -0.03 2.38 *** 2.35 *** 1.94 **
S&P 3.26 *** 1.90 ** 1.19 2.44 ** 1.41 * 1.30 *
Moody’s 3.20 *** 0.14 0.36 1.72 ** 3.44 *** nd
Fitch 0.14 -0.03 na -0.34 -0.93 1.32 *
Belgium 7.73 *** 2.75 *** 6.45 *** 3.32 *** 3.53 *** na
Italy 3.13 *** 5.66 *** na 2.93 *** na na
Spain 2.52 *** 1.73 ** na 1.66 ** 1.37 * na
Greece 2.12 ** 0.69 -0.36 0.81 0.81 1.88 **
Ireland -0.80 na na 0.42 0.40 na
Portugal 0.55 -0.37 -1.02 1.02 0.82 0.44
Panel A of the table reports the number of 5-minute returns identified as jumps by applying the Lee and Mykland (2008)
test adjusted by the intraday periodicty of volatility according to Boudt et al. (2011), defined in (3) and (4), at the 5%
significance level as well as the average absolute size of jumps. Panels B-D of the table report a preliminary analysis of the
degree of association between jumps and macroannouncements, government bond auctions and rating actions by applying
the z-test to compare the frequency of jumps occurrence around the event in analysis with respect to no-event situation.
The null hypothesis is that the two percentages are equal. As per macroannouncements, we just show the analysis according
to the classification in real economy, forward looking and price releases as reported in Table II while for government bond
auctions, we report only relevant countries. In case one of the two categories has less than 10 observations, the test statistic
is not reported (na). ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 6: Cojumps: summary statistics
≥ 2 2 3 4 5
PANEL A
No. 3,478 2,101 875 336 166
P(Cojump) 4.48 2.71 1.13 0.43 0.21
P(Cojump—Jump) 34.20 26.38 10.99 4.22 2.08
z-test z-test z-test z-test z-test
PANEL B: Macroannouncements
All 5.93 *** 2.71 *** 3.44 *** 3.85 *** 3.73 ***
US 6.45 *** 2.50 *** 3.67 *** 4.32 *** 5.58 ***
EA 4.16 *** 2.41 *** 3.08 *** 0.61 2.27 ***
Individual countries 2.17 *** 1.84 *** 0.57 0.78 0.82
Germany 3.01 *** 2.60 *** 1.70 *** 0.05 0.39
US - Real economy 6.38 *** 1.56 *** 4.37 *** 5.58 *** 5.18 ***
US - Forward looking 2.29 *** 0.76 1.89 *** 2.77 *** na
US - Price -0.11 0.68 na na na
EA - Real economy 2.22 *** 0.73 1.98 *** 0.80 1.72 ***
EA - Forward looking 3.68 *** 2.05 *** 3.46 *** 0.11 1.22
EA - Price -0.05 1.15 -1.1 -0.83 na
Individual countries - Real economy 0.35 0.62 0.05 0.44 -1.36
Individual countries - Forward looking 5.85 *** 4.46 *** 3.62 *** 1.04 0.78
Individual countries - Price -2.17 -1.94 -2.23 0.89 0.96
PANEL C: Bond auctions
All 1.02 -0.18 0.79 1.51 *** 1.26
France -1.86 -2.21 -1.46 2.48 *** -0.74
Germany -1.48 -1.74 -0.38 -0.94 1.67 ***
Belgium 1.41 *** 0.31 2.30 *** -0.02 na
Greece 5.18 *** 3.61 *** 1.85 *** 3.49 *** nd
Italy 4.73 *** 1.69 *** 3.75 *** 1.84 *** 4.08 ***
Spain 2.83 *** 2.85 *** 0.47 1.56 *** na
PANEL D: Rating actions
All 2.53 *** 2.67 *** 0.17 na na
S&P 3.38 *** 2.66 *** na na na
Moody’s 2.22 ** 2.37 *** 1.69 ** na na
Fitch -1.57 -0.66 na na na
Belgium 4.27 *** na na na na
Greece 2.45 *** 3.01 *** na na na
Ireland na na na na na
Italy 3.66 *** 2.99 *** na na na
Portugal 0.34 0.83 na na na
Spain 1.55 * 1.38 * na na na
Panel A of the table reports the number of contemporaneous cojumps identified by applying (5) on jumps
identified by applying the Lee and Mykland (2008) test adjusted by the intraday periodicty of volatility
according to Boudt et al. (2011), defined in (3) and (4), at the 5% significance level. Moreover, in order
to identify a sufficient number of cojumps for further analysis, we define a cojump if two or more jumps
occured in a 15-minute time window. P(Cojump—Jump) denotes the probability of a cojump given that at
least one of the country had a jump. Panels B-C of the table report a preliminary analysis of the degree
of association between cojumps and macroannouncements and government bond auctions by applying the
z-test to compare the frequency of cojumps occurrence around the event in analysis with respect to no-event.
The null hypothesis is that the two percentages are equal. We did not report tests for rating actions as we
observe a very low number of cojumps around rating actions which did not allow us to carry out the tests.
In case one of the two categories has less than 10 observations, the test statistic is not reported (na). As
per macroannouncements, we just show the analysis according to the classification in real economy, forward
looking and price releases as reported in Table II while for government bond auctions, we report only relevant
countries. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 7: Jumps: mean model
IT FR ES BE NL
constant -0.0084 -0.0267 ** -0.0478 * -0.1207 *** -0.0527
Macroannouncements - pre-release
γ1,2 (US - Chicago PMI) 0.0081 ** 0.0373 ** 0.0349 **
γ1,3 (US - Consumer confidence
indicator)
0.0702 *** 0.0158 **
γ1,12 (US - Nonfarm payroll) 0.0149 ** 0.0061 ** 0.0185 *** 0.0588 ** 0.0231 ***
γ1,13 (US - Philadelphia FED index) 0.0198 *** 0.0621 ***
γ1,14 (EA - Business Confidence
Indicator)
0.0263 **
γ1,18 (EA - Consumer confidence) 0.0006 0.0138 *** 0.024 ***
γ1,21 (EA - Industrial production) 0.0185 *** 0.0073 0.0162 ** 0.0742 *** 0.0313 ***
γ1,22 (EA - Introductory Statement) 0.0118 *** 0.0769 *** 0.0363 ** 0.0616 *** 0.0134 **
γ1,24 (EA - Monthly Bulletin) 0.0194 ** 0.0121 **
γ1,25 (EA - PMI Flash) 0.0183 *** 0.0107 ** 0.0146 ** 0.0523 *** 0.007
γ1,26 (EA - PMI Final) 0.0088 * 0.0111 * 0.0154 *
γ1,29 (EA - Unemployment) 0.0904 *** 0.0274 **
γ1,34 (DE - ZEW) 0.0197 ** 0.0138 **
γ1,32 (DE - Industrial production) 0.0132 ** 0.0282 **
γ1,37 (IT - GDP preliminary) 0.0179 *** 0.0188 *
γ1,40 (IT - Industrial production) 0.0128 ** 0.0054 * 0.0228 ***
γ1,42 (ES - Industrial production) 0.0292 *** 0.0726 *** 0.0444 **
γ1,53 (BE - Business confidence) 0.0207 *** 0.0266 ** 0.0253 **
Macroannouncements - post-release
γ2,2 (US - Chicago PMI) 1.728 *
γ2,2 (US - Consumer confidence
indicator)
1.9614 *** 1.5691 *** 3.5726 *
γ2,4 (US - CPI) 6.6378 *** 0.9187 1.7196 ** 12.8312 ***
γ2,5 (US - Durable goods) 1.7335 *
γ2,6 (US - Factory orders) 1.147 * 5.2546 **
γ2,7 (US - GDP advance) 3.5485 *** 4.5319 *** 5.7478 *** 4.9873 *** 8.4896 ***
γ2,8 (US - GDP preliminary) 2.8208 *
γ2,11 (US - Initial jobless claim) 15.2567 ** 9.7887 **
γ2,12 (US - Nonfarm payroll) 1.41 *** 2.029 *** 2.3598 *** 4.971 ** 3.5279 **
γ2,13 (US - Philadelphia FED index) 2.3236 ** 2.7091 ***
γ2,15 (US - Retail sales) 2.356 *** 3.0100 ** 1.1768 ** 9.2224 ***
γ2,16 (US - University of Michigan) 4.5626 ** 2.2563
γ2,17 (EA - Business climate) 5.0975 *** 1.1355 * 7.313 ***
γ2,22 (EA - Introductory Statement) 3.4608 *** 1.2720 ** 3.6751 *** 1.4495 ** 5.6737 **
γ2,24 (EA - Monthly Bulletin) 5.5966 ** 1.9078 ** 1.6095
γ2,25 (EA - PMI flash) 1.5258 * 5.0795 **
γ2,26 (EA - PMI final) 1.4799 ** 1.9646 ** 2.9073 **
γ2,31 (DE - Indusrial production) 1.5967 *
γ2,33 (DE - Unemployment) 3.229 ** 1.5679 * 5.2105 ***
γ2,45 (ES - Industrial production) 1.8163 ** 2.3331 ** 3.6045 ***
γ2,46 (ES - Unemployment) 6.0707 ** 8.7454 ***
γ2,55 (GR - GDP preliminary) 1.3366 * 1.5768 *
γ2,66 (NL - CPI) 0.121 7.5757 ***
γ2,67 (NL - Industrial production) 4.2871 **
Auctions - pre-release
γ1,62 (Germany) 0.0133 ** 0.0173 ** 0.0136 **
γ1,63 (Greece) 0.0205 ** 0.1833 * 0.0183 **
γ1,64 (Italy) 0.0281 *** 0.0212 ***
γ1,65 (Spain) 0.0276 ***
Auctions - post-release (bid-to-cover)
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Table 7: Jumps: mean model
IT FR ES BE NL
γ2,59 (Belgium) 1.192 2.2455 *
γ2,62 (Germany) 1.2966 * 10.4972 *** 2.5659 ** 5.0824 ** 4.5817 **
γ2,65 (Spain) 3.4627 ***
Auctions - post-release (average yield)
γ2,71 (France) 0.0281 *** 0.0212 ***
γ2,72 (Germany) 0.0133 ** 0.0173 ** 0.0136 **
γ2,74 (Italy) 0.0205 ** 0.1833 * 0.0183 **
γ2,77 (Spain) 0.0276 ***
Rating actions
γ2,78 (S&P) 0.0025 0.0041
The table reports the estimates for the mean equation of the Tobit-GARCH model in (8). The dependent variable is the absolute size
of jumps identified by applying the Lee and Mykland (2008) test corrected by the intraday periodicity of the volatility as proposed
by Boudt et al. (2011) and defined in (3) and (4). Macroannouncements and auctions pre-release are dummy variables taking
value equal to 1 for time intervals preceding the release up to 1 hour before. Macroannouncements and auctions post-release
effect is captured by the absolute size of surprise associated to the specific release. For bond auctions we define surprise as the
difference in average yield and bid-to-cover with respect to the previous auction. These ”surprises” are available just for 10-year
bond auctions. Surprises are loaded by specifc polynomial which have a decay structure as proposed by Andersen and Bollerslev
(1998) up to 1 hour after the release. Rating actions are dummy variables taking value 1 for time intervals following the action
up to 2 hours after the release, zero otherwise.
We report just variables which are significant at 10% level for at least one country. In some cases estimates are missing because
the correspondent dependent variable was not selected in the pre-selection procedure described in Section 4.2. Estimates for the
periodic component ξ are not reported. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 8: Variance model
IT FR ES BE NL
ω1 0.0004 * 0.0003 ** 0.0011 0.0018 * 0.0006
Macroannouncements - pre-release
ω2,2 (US - Chicago PMI) 0.0002 ** 0.0001 0.001 * 0.0002 0.0001
ω2,5 (US - Durable goods) 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 * 0.0000
ω2,9 (US - GDP final) 0.0002 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0000 0.0011 ** -0.0004
ω2,12 (US - Nonfarm payroll) 0.0002 ** 0.0006 *** 0.0002 ** 0.0001 0.0008 **
ω2,17 (EA - Business climate) 0.0035 *** 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000
ω2,22 (EA - Introductory Statement) -0.0001 0.0031 ** 0.0024 *** 0.0012 * 0.001 **
ω2,25 (EA - PMI flash) 0.0001 0.0002 *** 0.0008 0.0002 *** 0.0000
ω2,30 (DE - ZEW) 0.0000 0.0001 * 0.0003 0.0005 * 0.0004 *
ω2,40 (IT - Industrial production) 0.0002 *** 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0001
ω2,52 (ES - Unemployment) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 *** -0.0004 -0.0001
Auctions - pre-release
ω2,62 (Germany) 0.0009 0.0003 ** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000
ω2,63 (Greece) 0.0001 * 0.0005 ** 0.0002 * 0.0000 0.0006 **
ω2,65 (Italy) 0.0007 ** 0.0000 0.0007 ** 0.0001 ** 0.0000
ω2,67 (Spain) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 *** 0.0001 ** 0.0000
β 0.7464 *** 0.6843 *** 0.8043 *** 0.7839 *** 0.7034 ***
α1 0.0234 *** 0.0104 * 0.0123 ** 0.0201 ** 0.0024
Macroannouncements - post-release
α2,3 (US - Consumer confidence) -0.0465 0.8687 ** 0.6867 0.0416 0.5822 **
α2,8 (US - GDP preliminary) 0.0012 -0.0012 0.0949 ** -0.0007 0.1236 *
α2,9 (US - GDP final) 0.1908 * 0.4237 *** 0.5281 *** 0.3977 *** -0.1274
α2,12 (US - Nonfarm payroll) -0.0093 0.1849 *** -0.0678 0.9214 *** 0.1141 **
α2,15 (US - Retail sales) 0.1304 *** -0.0002 -0.0359 * -0.0030 0.1184 ***
α2,21 (EA - Industrial production) -0.0029 0.0286 * -0.0887 -0.0135 -0.0001
α2,22 (EA - Introductory Statement) 0.9606 *** 0.0214 0.2508 ** 0.3083 ** 0.2266 **
α2,26 (EA - PMI final) 0.3424 ** 0.3635 ** 0.0993 * -0.0865 0.0239
α2,31 (DE - Industrial production) -0.0923 0.1913 * -0.0986 * -0.0080 -0.0180
α2,33 (DE - Unemployment) 0.3564 *** -0.0131 -0.0393 0.0119 ** 0.2223 **
α2,37 (IT - GDP final) 0.0881 *** 0.1445 * -0.0391 0.2002 ** -0.0127
α2,45 (ES - Industrial production) -0.0089 -0.0225 0.2531 *** -0.0420 0.4423 ***
α2,46 (ES - Unemployment) 0.1847 *** 0.0232 0.0585 ** -0.0376 0.0191
α2,53 (BE - Business confidence) -0.0009 0.0735 *** 0.2813 ** 0.2694 *** -0.0026
Auctions - post-release (bid-to-cover)
α2,61 (Italy) -0.0018 0.0942 ** 0.0201 * 0.2105 ** -0.0022
α2,67 (Spain) -0.0114 0.0232 * 0.1352 *** -0.0483 0.3068 ***
Auctions - post-release (average yield)
α2,75 (Belgium) 0.0834 * -0.0193 0.0152 * 0.0026 -0.0113
α2,75 (Germany) -0.041 ** -0.0717 -0.0179 0.0008 0.0139 *
α2,75 (Italy) 0.1523 *** -0.0850 * 0.0026 0.3799 ** 0.0031
ν1 0.4983 ** 0.0584 ** 0.0313 ** 0.0244 * 0.0683 ***
Macroannouncements - post-release - Asymmetric effect
ν2,5 (US - Durable goods) 0.0975 * 0.372 ** 0.0401 -0.0249 -0.0814
ν2,9 (US - GDP final) -0.0913 -0.1682 0.1598 * 0.3252 *** -0.0035
ν2,12 (US - Nonfarm payroll) 0.6542 ** -0.0966 0.0324 0.0501 0.4138 ***
ν2,13 (US - Philadelphia FED Index) 0.0117 0.5959 *** 0.7321 *** -0.0169 -0.0272
ν2,21 (EA - Industrial production) 0.0996 * -0.0171 0.0083 -0.0731 0.2282 **
ν2,22 (EA - Introductory Statement) -0.0722 0.4025 *** -0.0076 0.0476 *** -0.0297
ν2,26 (EA - PMI final) 0.0984 * -0.3264 ** -0.0849 -0.0145 -0.5248 **
ν2,28 (EA - Retail sales) 0.1041 * 0.1963 * 0.2745 *** -0.0505 -0.0332
ν2,32 (DE - Industrial production) 0.0989 ** -0.0090 0.2542 ** -0.1686 ** -0.0983
ν2,35 (IT - Business confidence) 0.0033 0.0012 0.3218 ** -0.0156 -0.6209 **
ν2,39 (IT - GDP final) 0.3359 *** 0.1222 ** 0.1038 * -0.0523 -0.0168
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Table 8: Variance model
IT FR ES BE NL
ν2,44 (ES - GDP Final) 0.1376 ** 0.3167 *** 0.537 *** -0.0785 -0.0031
ν2,45 (ES - Industrial Production) 0.0933 0.1370 -0.0307 -0.1071 ** -0.0539
ν2,46 (ES - Unemployment) 0.0008 0.0434 0.3021 ** 0.2864 ** 0.4323 ***
ν2,53 (BE - Business confidence) 0.0931 * 0.1102 -0.1317 * -0.1822 ** -0.0033
ν2,57 (GR - Unemployment) -0.0977 0.3788 ** -0.0043 -0.1817 -0.0645
ν2,67 (NL - Industrial production) -0.0405 0.2785 ** 0.3803 ** -0.0674 -0.1253 *
Auctions - post-release (average yield) - Asymmetric effect
ν2,72 (Germany) 0.0436 0.1068 * 0.0118 -0.3326 *** -0.3062 ***
ν2,74 (Italy) 0.1998 ** 0.4182 *** 0.1605 ** -0.0148 -0.0800
ν2,77 (Spain) 0.0499 * -0.0394 0.0657 * 0.0000 -0.0042
The table reports the estimates for the variance equation of the Tobit-GARCH model in (9). The dependent variable is
the absolute size of jumps identified by applying the Lee and Mykland (2008) test corrected by the intraday periodicity
of the volatility as proposed by Boudt et al. (2011) and defined in (3) and (4). Macroannouncements and auctions
pre-release are dummy variables taking value equal to 1 for time intervals preceding the release up to 1 hour before the
release. Macroannouncements and auctions post-release effect is captured by dummy variables equal to 1 for large
surprise. Large surprises are defined as: —Surprise— ≥0.5 SD(Surprise). For bond auctions we define surprise as the
difference in average yield and bid-to-cover with respect to the previous auction. These ”surprises” are available just for
10-year bond auctions. Surprises are evaluated up to 1 hour after the release. Rating actions are dummy variables taking
value 1 for time intervals following the action up to 2 hours after the release, zero otherwise. Macroannouncements and
auctions post-release - Asymmetric and Rating actions - Asymmetric are defined as for Macroannouncements and
auctions post-release. We report just variables which are statistically significant at 10% level for at least one Country. ***,
**, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
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Table 9: Cojumps: logit model
Constant -3.1535 ***
Macroannouncements - pre-release
γ1,9 (US - Business inventories) -0.7571 ***
γ1,12 (US - Non-farm payroll) 1.2695 ***
γ1,19 (EA - Business confidence indicator) -0.6844 **
γ1,22 (EA - Introductory Statement) 0.5952 **
γ1,23 (EA - Monthly Bulletin) 0.7094 ***
γ1,25 (EA - PMI flash) 0.7348 ***
γ1,26 (EA - PMI final) 0.6965 ***
γ1,27 (DE - ZEW) 0.4141 *
γ1,36 (IT - GDP Final) 1.3138 ***
γ1,55 (BE- Business confidence) 0.4185 **
Macroannouncements - post-release
γ2,7 (US - GDP advance) 0.3778 **
γ2,12 (US - Nonfarm payroll) 0.4067 ***
γ2,14 (US - Production index) -0.4609 **
γ2,15 (US - Retail sales) 0.3682 ***
γ2,26 (EA - PMI final) 0.1006 *
γ2,24 (EA - Introductory Statement) 0.6468 ***
γ2,31 (DE - Business confidence) 0.1133 *
γ2,44 (ES - GDP final) 1.2294 ***
γ2,45 (ES - Industrial production) 0.2207 ***
Auctions - pre-release
γ1,59 (Belgium) 0.3908 *
γ1,64 (Italy) 0.4389 **
γ1,66 (Portugal) -0.6717 **
Auctions - post-release (average yield)
γ2,64 (Italy) 0.8793 **
γ2,67 (Spain) 3.1284 ***
Test statistics
LogL -4,888.52
LR test 346.38 ***
Area under ROC curve 0.61
The table reports the estimates for the logit model on cojumps. The dependent variable is the contempora-
neous Cojump defined in (5) based on jumps identified according to Lee and Mykland (2008) test corrected
by the intraday periodicity of the volatility as proposed by Boudt et al. (2011) and defined in (3) and
(4). The interecept of the logit model is corrected by (10) as suggested by the prior correction approach.
Macroannouncements and auctions pre-release are dummy variables taking value equal to 1 for time
intervals preceding the release up to 1 hour before the release. Macroannouncements and auctions
post-release effect is captured by the absolute size of surprise associated to the specific release. For bond
auctions we define surprise as the difference in average yield and bid-to-cover with respect to the previous
auction. These ”surprises” are available just for 10-year bond auctions. Surprise effects are taken into con-
sideration up to 1 hour after the release. We report just variables which are statistically significant at 10%
level. ROC curve: receiver operating characteristic curve. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
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